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Communications
Tom Anderson, Jeremy Busby, Antonios Gouglidis, Karen Hough,
David Hutchison and Mark Rouncefield
Abstract Human and organizational issues are able to create both vulnerabilities
and resilience to threats. In this chapter, we investigate human and organizational
factors, conducted through ethnographic studies of operators and sets of interviews
with staff responsible for security, reliability and quality in two different organiza-
tions, which own and operate utility networks. Ethnography is a qualitative orien-
tation to research that emphasizes the detailed observation and interview of people
in naturally occurring settings. Our findings indicate that ’human error’ forms the
biggest threat to cyber-security and that there is a need for Security Operational Cen-
tres to document all cyber-security accidents. Also, we conclude that it will always
be insufficient to assess mental security models in terms of their technical correct-
ness, as it is sometimes more important to know how well they represent prevailing
social issues and requirements. As a practical recommendation from this work, we
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suggest that utility organizations engage in penetration testing and perhaps other
forms of vulnerability analysis, not only to discover specific vulnerabilities but also
to learn more about the mental models they use.
1 Introduction
Communication networks are increasingly seen as critical infrastructures, and their
resilience – the ability to offer an acceptable level of service despite the challenges
that threaten them – is the subject of this book [10, 21, 22]. In this chapter, we report
on the often neglected but crucial human and organizational issues in communica-
tion networks resilience. Networked systems are generally complex, and they have
three aspects that need to be considered in combination when building resilience
into them: these are technology, organization, and people, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
The approach we take is to study utility networks, which are examples of cyber-
physical systems that offer a suitably general model for our work [4, 6].
A common approach towards conceptually understanding cyber-physical sys-
tems is to divide them into ’levels’, based on their function. Devices, boundaries,
processes, etc. are then associated with each level, depending on the industry and
network topology in question. Nevertheless, in all cases, there is a clear indication
of the complexity and interconnections between the levels. To cope with the differ-
ent levels and for achieving resilient communications we propose the investigation
of systems based on three viewpoints, viz. Organization, Technology and Individual
(OTI) [5].
The application of the OTI viewpoints, depicted in Fig. 2, enables a broader view
of the system, i.e., a representation of the whole system from the perspective of a
related set of concerns. Thus, this helps to increase the level of threat awareness by
Fig. 1 Technology, organization, and people in networked systems
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identifying potential vulnerability-creating behaviours. Specifically, the three view-
points are concerned with: The organization viewpoint, with the groups of people
who work together in an organized way for a shared purpose as well as any poli-
cies, processes and procedures in the organization; The technology viewpoint, with
the implemented technologies in a system including the software, hardware and
network components, as well as any communications among them; The individual
viewpoint, with the way a single person or entity acts or behaves in a specific situa-
tion or under particular conditions.
OTI can be used to increase awareness on both technical and non-technical risks.
The technical risks may be identified by conducting several security assessments
[12]. These may unveil potential vulnerabilities and also provide information on
how they can be exploited. However, such activities may not be able to provide
enough context on human and organizational aspects. When the latter is combined
with technical findings, it may lead to the construction of more resilient strategies
against cyber-attacks. The investigation of human and organization may help to
successfully identify people and their roles; understand the policies used in an or-
ganization; identify social relations among employees; understand their behaviour,
etc. That information may refine the input required by OTI and risk management
approaches [16, 17] and help to define preventive processes in the sense of esti-
mating and minimizing the risk of successful cyber-attacks (e.g., ransomware [13],
advanced persistent threats [7]).
The investigation of organizational factors in utility organizations includes two
ethnographic studies of operator practices in different utilities, especially their use
of mobile devices but more widely the vulnerabilities that arise from working con-
ditions, technology affordances and social context. For us, issues of resilience and
security are not simply, or merely, technical issues resolved by technical means. In-
stead, we see the prevalence of what are termed ’human factors’ – and especially
when it comes to failures of various kinds. Accordingly, we would like to say a little
Fig. 2 The OTI viewpoints
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about the ethnographic stance we have adopted to the research. Ethnography is a
qualitative orientation to research that emphasizes the detailed observation and in-
terview of people in naturally occurring settings – in this case two utility companies.
The main virtue of this ethnographic approach lies in its ability to make visible the
’real world’ sociality of a setting – to tell us something about what working in that
environment is actually like – to unpack some of the ’human factors’ involved – or in
this case what the security concerns of those working in any particular domain might
look like. The emphasis then is on producing reasonably detailed descriptions of the
everyday ’workaday’ activities of social actors who live and work within the setting,
developing an ’appreciative stance’ of the nature of the work and the perceptions of
those involved. The concern is to get some kind of access to the everyday ways in
which participants understand and conduct their working lives, in this case, their
understanding and perceptions about various kinds of cyber-risk and vulnerabilities.
2 Ethnographic Research
The aim of our ethnographic work was to assemble some account of the differ-
ent ways in which people, as organizational actors, managed and organized their
everyday working lives, with a particular emphasis on everyday security. This ne-
cessitates the fieldworker becoming involved in some sense in the setting itself and
the everyday activities being carried out. It requires some willingness to pay full
attention to what people are doing and what people are saying, in order to gain the
same perspective, as far as this is possible, of the actors concerned; and counteract-
ing the temptation, when studying others’ lives, to read things into them. The aim
was to observe, record and describe the phenomena of everyday organizational life
independently of any existing theories and methods. This involves dispensing with
conventional research preconceptions that there are numerous things that people are
doing that are trivial, the mere fact that people are doing them justifies the attention
given by the researcher. We are resolutely interested in our participants. What kinds
of things do they take for granted or presuppose in going about their work, what
kinds of things do they routinely notice, what kinds of things are they on the look-
out for? How do they tune themselves in to the state of being at work?, what are the
constituents of their ’serious’ or ’at work’ frame of mind? How do they react to the
things that occur within their sphere of attention?, what objectives are they seeking
to attain in their reactions to whatever occurs? (see Table 1).
The observations and the ethnographic interviews were concerned with some
general questions on experience and perceptions of security and risk, as well as
with any working ‘model’ of risk held by our participants.
So, for example, we asked questions concerning:
1. What do they perceive as risky, and why? What do they perceive as NOT risky
and why? Does this change, has it changed, will it change?
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Table 1 Precepts for ethnographic analysis
Precepts
1. Assume that the world is socially organized – and show how this orderliness is accomplished.
2. See the setting and its activities as socially organized from within.
3. Understand the setting and its activities in terms that members understand.
4. Examine activities in all their detail.
5. Treat activities as situated – activities are not isolated but situated within a context.
6. Attend to the ’working division of labour’ – understand coordination.
7. Tasks and activities are sequenced – integral to the interactional sense of activity.
8. Attend to the egological organization of activities – people do things not organizations.
9. Do not draw a distinction between expert knowledge and practical knowledge.
10. Do not treat settings as equivalent – beware spurious and unwarranted generalization.
2. How is their view different from other people? How is it the same? Are there
incongruences, contradictions within one informant or between different infor-
mants?
And in our analysis we were interested in:
1. Models of Risk: How did each of the interviewees model risk?
2. How did the different models of risk play out with each other? Were there co-
existing models within the same person?
3. How did the models of risk change?
Our ethnographic studies were conducted on the premises of two different or-
ganizations, including an information service provider (ISP) and a utility provider,
both located in the European Union. The participants were initially provided with
a consent form, which provided information about the nature of the project, the
procedures of our studies and their rights under the data protection act. A diverse
group of people were interviewed in both organizations, including security adminis-
trators/analysts/engineers, managers, customers support personnel and technicians.
The research findings of our analyses are presented in the following section.
3 Research findings
Below we present some very brief and anonymized (and perhaps, therefore, rela-
tively anodyne) excerpts from the research, primarily to give some general indi-
cations of the approach and our initial findings, and presented so as to preserve
confidentiality and our participants’ anonymity. Since this chapter is in the public
domain we have made judicious selections from the more comprehensive fieldwork
reports that were made available to the project members.
Firstly, in our information service provider, in terms of procedures for notification
and response to a security incident; staff were alerted directly by emails or SMS, or
6 Authors Suppressed Due to Excessive Length
by other junior staff, of any cyber-security incidents. However, all of the staff inter-
viewed had problems giving precise details regarding the exact protocols to follow.
They stated that often to save time, nobody looked for the origins of the security in-
cident but only at how to remedy it. There also seemed to be some confusion among
them regarding the exact procedures and most limited themselves to talking about
prevention, i.e., administrating back-ups and anti-virus updates. In terms of the con-
trols adopted; they were deemed to be of both a social and technical nature. Most
of those interviewed talked about the strict controls put in place regarding phys-
ical entry to data sensitive areas, including most notably the data centre. Access
was limited to just 20 people and special badges and fingerprinting controls were in
place.
Reported security incidents were variously categorized as: a) human error – such
as responding to a spam email; b) training failures – this included issues of the phys-
ical security of buildings as well as failure to up-date virus software and firewalls;
and c) outside hackers, since many of those interviewed mentioned the threat of
malware attacks on data and master boot records rendering systems inoperable. In-
terestingly the main threat to security however was deemed to be accidental rather
than malicious.
In terms of solutions proposed by the staff: our researcher was clearly told that
more investment was needed. Many suggested that one solution needed was to en-
crypt all the hard discs of all computers. All of the staff interviewed stated that they
wanted to install real time surveillance software including intrusion detection sys-
tems (IPS), intrusion prevention systems (IPS) and one employee suggested using
a military type device lock apparatus to prevent data loss. Most suggested that they
should focus on prevention more than anything i.e., back-up of data and keeping
anti-virus software up to date. Improving security, they said, was held back by a
lack of funding and lack of acknowledgement of real threats; as one person stated,
’it is important that it works, not that it is the best’, and ’when it doesn’t work any-
more they simply want to plug the hole and not pay too much to buy new software.
We have many problems due to old obsolete machinery that is not compatible with
new technology’.
There was also more focus placed on physical security i.e., securing the premises
with fences and closed-circuit cameras and infrared structures (as they have found
thieves on the premises) than on cyber-security. Some staff stated that security of-
ten came down to the individual conscience, what they personally felt was right.
However, the overall consensus was that the most successful intervention to im-
prove cyber-security would be to create rigorous training courses for all staff at all
levels. There was an impression that many training courses in cyber-security were
undertaken to fulfil legal obligations and were not necessarily taken seriously by
staff. In terms of a ‘Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) Policy’: since a BYOD policy
can present a number of potential security risks, the company provides the devices
(so there is no BYOD) and depending on their particular job each individual could
choose which brand since all acquisitions were usually related to job needs. A cyber-
security incident was reported that happened in the control room due to an infected
pen drive being inserted into a computer by an external consultant. The incident
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was deemed to be an ’accident’ as the person was ’well known’ and ’trusted’ and
’a good person’. The impact of this event in terms of downtime was variously re-
ported as participants were genuinely worried about reporting negative things, ’we
do not spit on the plate from which we eat’. Employees were allowed to take their
personal telephones on site, although they were not permitted to use them in cer-
tain areas. The participants themselves did not perceive smart-phones as posing any
risk to cyber-security since they were never used to connect to the networks. One
participant stated that the most one could do was ’take a photo of the control room
and monitors and maybe sell it to an interested party’ – suggesting a lack of knowl-
edge of some of the security implications of smart-phones. Some employees had
copies of non-standard software on their computers. The reason they downloaded
this software was because it was deemed essential for their job, but the company
did not have the resources to buy it. In conclusion, for this organization (but perhaps
reflecting the circumstances of many other organizations), we can state that there
appeared to be an overall consensus in identifying human error as the biggest threat
to cyber-security. Many said that there needed to be a change in culture in which
staff at all levels were made to realize the importance of cyber-security and appro-
priate training. The main technical improvements to cyber-security nominated by
staff were those of real time surveillance software, such as IPS, IDS, NAC (network
access control) systems. Another important finding was that staff themselves com-
plained about the lack of centralization regarding cyber-security issues. The need
for a Security Operational Centre that documented all cyber-security incidents was
deemed fundamental by the staff; in particular it was considered essential for con-
trolling the security centrally on site. One respondent stated that, “each person is
responsible for looking after their own garden” meaning that the system is fragmen-
tary and that the different companies working together at the site all took care of
their own sector and that there was no coordination between them. In Table 2, we
summarize the identified issues, incidents and solutions in the information service
provider organization.
Second, in our utility provider, we again provide some (anonymized) extracts and
quotes from the interviews concerning cyber-security with various staff at the utility
Table 2 Resilience: Information service provider
Information service provider
Issues
Procedures for notification and response.
Controls adopted; social and technical nature.
Security - lack of funding and lack of acknowledgement of real threats.
Lack of centralization regarding cyber-security issues.
Incidents
Security incidents categorized a) human error; b) training failures;
c) external hackers.
Human error - biggest threat to cyber-security.
Solutions
Investment; encryption; real time surveillance software;
rigorous training courses.
Focus on prevention; focus on physical security.
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provider. One interviewee perceived the company’s risk as low, explaining that some
security systems are currently deployed, but that security is not a priority at the mo-
ment. Cyber-attacks were not seen as probable, and, consequently, as very low risk.
The other risk the interviewee was most conscious of was the Wi-Fi. This is most
evident because of the fact that they believe that equipment they normally use has
a propensity to get viruses. Also, their devices (e.g., both their personal and work
ones) can connect to the Wi-Fi directly at work, without much in terms of controls.
But, even so, the interviewee did not regard this as being too risky: it was suggested
that their level of risk was like any other company that had a clients’ database; and
because when someone, such as a hacker, enters the Wi-Fi, he/she can, for example,
command a concentrator to stop, but nothing much else, in the way of malicious
operations can be done. They suggested that therefore there was little value or re-
ward to any hacker who hacked the system. Consequently, the interviewee regarded
usability as more important than prevention because they did not really feel they
were under risk. However, the tools that prevent security intrusions also sometimes
reduce usability and both the company and the employees seemed to prioritize us-
ability over protection/security. This kind of prioritization is done, and is seen, for
example, in enabling employees to connect from home and see a customers’ data, in
case a customer rang with a query or even to re-establish power if power had been
cut. However, they argued that having in place a range of security mechanisms not
permit performing such operations could risk customer displeasure.
For another interviewee, the risks of intervening using ’informatics’ also seemed
very low. Specifically, they seemed not to be worried about Internet security risks
because many of the same things (security breaches), that might be achieved through
the Internet, could be done through other means. The only possibility they saw was
where somebody controlled the Smart Meter (SM) (counting less, counting more,
bringing it down to zero). This is a case where they acknowledge the existence
of a risk. Yet, it was not considered to be important for someone to be able just
to read a SM. Something that could be done is to change the meter reading, but
electronic tricks in that sense are unheard of. This is something they said could be
done mechanically or manually on the SM; however, they have not yet seen this
done by means of IT’. Furthermore, it is believed that the level of security they
have is the appropriate one. Despite the fact they state that their assets are not very
desirable, they also indicate that more IT-based security could be put in place.
In terms of cascade effects and interdependencies, it was mentioned that if there
was no power, the Internet can not work because of its interdependency with elec-
tricity distribution. Looking at other, related, interdependencies, the police force was
mentioned as a service that might thereby be impacted by malicious intrusions. If
there is no power or phone and there is an emergency, the police would not be in
position to find it out or respond. This means that somebody could intrude into their
system and disturb such services. Therefore, a possible impact on their communica-
tion services was identified as being among the most important ones. Furthermore,
it was said that in the absence of an Internet connection, a reading of a SM would be
infeasible. However, this was not believed to be a problem since this is an operation
that can be done manually by technicians. Lastly, it was noted that being a small
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company requires just a short period of time for personnel to access the various lo-
cations of their physical system. Also, there is also no high or visible dependence
from other networks as sometimes happens in companies handling bigger networks.
Finally, another interviewee was quite sceptical about security measures, seem-
ing to think that all that was needed was already in place. Specifically, it was said that
they could restrict connections to the enterprise resource planning system (ERP), but
this was yet to be done. The reason for not doing it was that there was a need to ac-
cess the system from anywhere, and that they did not want security measures to
get in the way of their access to the ERP, i.e. it was an issue of usability. One of
their protection measures was the existence of a 30 days limit for their password,
which was required to change by the system after it expired. Passwords were also
encrypted. Although the administrator could re-establish a password, he/she was not
in any position to know the password. The ERP was said to be very good since it was
well-known software and used by several major companies. This was not a product
developed by them, and thus, there was a need for many other things to be done in
it; hence, security was not their primary priority. Lastly, it was mentioned that the
reason why they did not worry about security is because they believed that all the
security measures they needed were already in place. In Table 3, we summarize the
identified issues, incidents and solutions in the utility provider organization.
Table 3 Resilience: Utility provider
Utility provider
Issues
Risk seen as low; security is not a priority.
Little value or reward to typical hacker.
Prioritize usability over protection/security.
Not concerned about Internet security risks.
Incidents Cascade effects and interdependencies.
Solutions Belief or complacency that all the securitymeasures needed are already in place.
4 Analysis of ethnographic and interview data: the ‘mental
models’ used in reasoning about risk
Our first analysis is based on developing an understanding of the ’mental mod-
els’ with which organizational members address risks as part of their organizational
roles. The elicitation of mental models in risk studies has generally been aimed at
uncovering deficiencies in individuals’ understanding of complex risks (for example
[2]). But the work on mental models in our project used unstructured interviewing
and ethnography to get a more contextualized understanding of exactly how orga-
nizational members use particular interpretive schemes, heuristics and other ways
of discursive reasoning in order to deal with organizational risks. We have there-
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fore developed an analysis that is closer to notions of the social construction of
risk and Hilgartner’s [9] approach in particular. In this approach, risk objects come
into prominence, or recede out of prominence, in a process termed ’emplacement’
and ’displacement’. Emplacement occurs typically when the consequences of a risk
become magnified in social discourse for some reason, or the causes of risk seem
to be less manageable and more likely. Displacement occurs when risk appears to
come under greater control. Our primary concern has, therefore, been with how the
interpretive themes or models that people exhibit perform this emplacement and
displacement. To recap: there were two fieldwork sites: the first, in which an organi-
zation operating the utility service was the subject of the work; the second, in which
an organization providing an information systems service to a utility was the sub-
ject of the work. The two utilities operated in different industries, and were of a very
different size and character. The process of analysis was to take the fieldworkers’
notes, including interview transcripts, and select fragments that are self-contained
and give evidence of some kind of model or schema in a persons explanation of
risk in the utility organization they work in. As many of the interviews were not
in English, the two fieldworkers translated all notes (including verbatim interview
extracts) into English before analysis. The fragments were then coded according to
the model or schema, and according to the risk emplacement and displacement pro-
cess being supported by the model. The codes were then used to gather fragments
together, and higher-level codes developed in order to provide a systematic account
of the nature of the models and their emplacement and displacement functions.
It is clear that organizational members have a wide variety of models across both
technical and social domains. The ’models’ are not generally integrated, uniform,
self-consistent representations even within individuals. They tend to be, or at least
emerge as, fragmentary and partial, and serve as discursive resources to justify a
claim as much as resources for reasoning about a claim.
The function in the utility organization was much more often displacement than
emplacement, but more emplacement than displacement for the systems organiza-
tion. The context of the interviews and observations has to be borne in mind, how-
ever. Experience of cyber-security risk, in particular, had been much more extensive
at one of the sites. Moreover, sometimes emplacement and displacement went to-
gether. A risk may be emplaced in order to show how the organization has taken it
seriously enough to displace it with strong controls.
One of the fieldworkers argued that one of the fieldwork sites had a clear no-
tion of actual and potential risks. This does not seem coherent logically, as all risks
involve some kind of potential for harm, but it clearly mattered to one of the or-
ganizations that they could acknowledge that some risk existed, but had reasonable
grounds for not devoting resources to managing it. Potential risks were, in some
sense, ’theoretical’ and ’general’ de-contextualized and offering no reason for act-
ing on them in this organization. The fieldworker referred to two ’registers’ of risk.
At both field sites, cyber-security risks were displaced by other risks being seen as
substantially more important.
It is quite hard to categorize the informants’ models in terms of whether they
produce vulnerability or resilience. Logically, they are inevitably a source of both
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enabling people to reach an understanding of a risk but simultaneously constraining
the way they do so. The main kinds of model found in the analysis were as follows
(see Table 4):
Table 4 Modelling risk
Models
1. Failure path models – sequences of action that lead to some failure state
2. Access and connection models – connectedness of entities in a system and the accessibility of
one to another.
3. Functionality and protection models – what a system can do, and its protective function.
4. Technical boundary models – boundaries of responsibility for risk and competence.
5. Experiential narrative models - narratives of incidents, or risks.
6. Ordering models – that puts security risk below other threats and other demands on resources.
7. Frequency models – where frequency becomes a dominant criterion for allocating attention.
8. Cost-benefit models – where risk controls are unnecessary as costs exceed benefits.
9. Responsibility attribution models – where others are responsible for particular risks.
10. Abstract, global attribute models – characterizations of a whole organization or situation.
1. Failure path models. These represented sequences of action that led to some
failure state. They were generally straightforward, and enabled people to reason
about how plausible they were. For example, one informant reasoned that risks
were low because of the way an attacker would need certain expertise to gain
access to computing devices, and then a different kind of expertise to actuate
physical devices.
2. Access and connection models. These represented the connectedness of entities
in a system and the accessibility of one to another typically the accessibility of
some vulnerable entity like data or a physical actuator to some person, some role,
some computer or other device. This accessibility was the basis for reasoning
about a related risk. Such models were also implicated in statements people made
about redundancy in vital links.
3. Functionality and protection models. These represented what a system of some
kind could do, especially what kinds of protective function it provided. People
did not seem to have an explanation, particularly, but simply a representation
of a capability or capacity. For example, systems had firewalls, systems blocked
certain kinds of access, and systems could produce certain kinds of harm.
4. Technical boundary models. These were related to responsibility models (be-
low) but were primarily representations of the technical system as a collection
of devices that were strongly partitioned, and typically supplied by different
providers. The boundaries represented boundaries of responsibility for risk and
boundaries of competence. Sometimes people would say we can only do some-
thing about X but not Y to indicate a residual uncertainty about a risk that was
partially the responsibility of someone else.
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5. Experiential narrative models. These were narratives generally of incidents, or
materialized risks of some sort. It was often not obvious what these led to: people
would offer a narrative without general conclusion, indicating that it was suffi-
cient itself. Narratives are not quite the same as models, not necessarily being
representations of something in the world. But they seemed to function as mod-
els, providing structured accounts of some issue or problem (in this case security
risk) that had come into the discourse. Often the narrative involved emplacing a
risk, explaining an event in the recent past, and then displacing it by reasoning
about how controls had subsequently been brought in. Logically, the current state
of security is described by the current state of the system, but the narrative se-
quence of some experienced event followed by some remedial action seemed to
help people reason about security. In the systems organization there were more
failure narratives, with less risk displacement as a conclusion.
6. Ordering models. Often the explanation for a lack of interest in certain kinds
of risk was based on priority: an ordering that put security risk well below other
threats and other demands on resources more generally. In the utility organiza-
tion, the main risks were seen by some as being commercial, displacing cyber-
security risks; in the systems organization, the main risks were said to be seen as
being physical. Ordering models are not of a risk itself, nor of the organization
or its resources, but of a problem set that exists in some priority ordering. We
tend to think of mental models as representations of the world out there for an
individual or group. But, for an action-oriented actor, it may be less important to
have a descriptive representation of this kind than to have a list of actions and
associated priorities.
7. Frequency models. These are closest perhaps to the long-standing concern with
the heuristics people use to deal with probabilistic problems. People give evi-
dence in their language of an effort to represent the frequency of different kinds
of event, and obviously in the context of risks the frequency becomes a domi-
nant criterion for allocating attention. People often referred to the experience as
a way of estimating frequency in a rough way: for example referring to the way in
which they had sometimes experienced one kind of problem or failure but never
experienced another. An expert, technical observer could easily point to the log-
ical flaws in inferring probability from historical frequency in a non-stationary
domain. But people gave no evidence that inferring frequency from experience
was somehow problematic.
8. Cost-benefit models. People would sometimes reason that risks were low be-
cause the costs to an adversary were high and benefits low. This was typically
a risk displacement strategy. They also argued that possible risk controls were
unnecessary as their cost exceeded their benefit. In this sense, risks could be
displaced not by being small but by having solutions that were prohibitively ex-
pensive.
9. Responsibility attribution models. Patterns of responsibility, often patterns in
which others are responsible for particular risks, sometimes appeared to under-
lie people’s responses. Equipment manufacturers, for example, were commonly
attributed with responsibility for the security of their products, and from this peo-
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ple inferred that risks to those products were therefore low. Responsibility was
attributed over time as well as technical and social space. In one case someone
displaced security risk by saying relevant decisions were ’made in the past and
that we do not worry about this any more’. Occasionally these models incorpo-
rated some representation of legal responsibility, but this was not prominent in
the data.
10. Abstract, global attribute models. These were simple characterizations of a
whole organization or situation. Those of the utility organization were more op-
timistic: for example, some people had a simple model of sufficiency: a general
belief that there were enough appropriate controls to nullify risk. In the systems
organization these were more pessimistic: characterizing the utility organization
it supported as having a culture inappropriate to security in a number of ways.
As we suggested, these models could equally be a source of vulnerability or of
resilience. It is the specific context and specific manifestation that will be deci-
sive. But it is instructive how wide-ranging the types of model are. They are not
just block diagrams in which one semantic element is linked to another. They are
qualitatively quite different, and point to the resourcefulness of organizational
members coping with a world that is complex not only in having many compo-
nents but in making many demands on people acting in it. Some of these demands
involve having an appropriate representation of a conventional system a network
of devices for instance but others involve having an appropriate representation of
other peoples expectations and capacities, of norms and conventions, and so on.
This means it will always be insufficient to assess mental models of security in
terms of their technical correctness, as it will sometimes be more important to con-
sider how well they represent prevailing social issues and requirements. At one of
the field sites, a researcher with ICS cyber-security expertise as a practitioner under-
took a penetration test of part of the organization’s systems. This produced a tech-
nical understanding of some of its vulnerabilities, indicating certain vulnerabilities
that the organization had formerly seemed unconcerned about. This, on face value,
suggests that the organization members had imperfect mental models or interpretive
schemes of the system under their management. But it is important to recognize
that such models are adaptations to a wide variety of experiences of which technical
experts have no knowledge. They cannot therefore be judged as deficient or other-
wise in some general sense. What is more important is that there is an awareness
within the system of how those models contribute and detract from its security. As
a practical recommendation of this work, we therefore suggest that utility organiza-
tions engage in penetration testing and perhaps other forms of vulnerability analysis,
not only to discover specific vulnerabilities but also to learn more about the mental
models they use, models that are important in shaping these vulnerabilities.
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5 Conclusion
What has emerged from our empirical studies of people and organizations, as they
struggle with concerns about resilience, is the connection with other issues that have
traditionally bothered those interested in the computer-human interface: notably the
challenges of dependability, reliability, safety and security. As computer-based sys-
tems – embracing humans, computers and engineered systems – become more com-
plex and organizationally embedded, so these challenges involving complex inter-
actions among technologies, organizations and individuals have multiplied. While
much of the work on reliability and resilience has naturally focused on major and of-
ten catastrophic failures, what has been documented in this research has been some
of the more ordinary, everyday instances of failure. Not surprisingly, perhaps, in-
stances of lack of resilience in many settings are not normally catastrophic but are
rather mundane events that occasion situated practical inquiry and repair – people
work out how to deal with incidents as they occur. Resilience, like ideas about re-
liability or dependability, can be seen as being the outcome of peoples’ everyday,
coordinated, practical actions. Workers draw on more or less dependable artefacts
and structures as resources for their work of achieving organizational objectives
through the interaction between technical systems and human skills. Our empiri-
cal studies illustrate that abstract ‘rules for resilience – such as procedures, models,
proscriptions, prescriptions, etc. – have to be applied within the context of socially
organized work settings in which those who have to apply such rules have to deal
with whatever contingencies arise. As the International Atomic Energy Authority
(IAEA) literature (2006) states ‘An important factor in a management system is the
recognition of the entire range of interactions of individuals at all levels with tech-
nology and with organizations’[11].
This kind of argument and analysis concerning resilience, also links to ideas
about reliability, and thereby resolves or modifies, to some extent, the on-going dis-
pute between the idea of the High Reliability Organization (HRO) and the idea of
the ‘normal accident’ [15]. Reliability can be defined as the ability of a system to
deliver in the quantity and the quality expected by users. The term High Reliability
Organization (HRO) was assigned to a group of organizations that were assumed
to operate virtually error-free in risk-laden environments, where failure could lead
to disaster [18]. Ethnographic studies conducted on operational nuclear power sta-
tions [3, 14], nuclear-powered aircraft carriers [19] and nuclear-armed submarines
[1], described the structural mechanisms that were assumed to make HROs depend-
ably safe and reliable. Although characterized by having high degrees of interactive
complexity that allowed for system unpredictability and system interdependencies
that ensured tight coupling, the HRO structural mechanisms of containment sug-
gested the ability to avoid accidents that might normally be expected – as in Per-
row’s concept of ‘normal-accidents’ [15]. As well as macro-analysis of structures
at the organizational level, HROs have been assessed in terms of their culture [28].
At the micro-level HROs were assessed in terms of members skills and abilities,
and the pattern of heedful interrelations in a social setting that were seen as ev-
idence of a collective mind [29]. From this perspective, people within inherently
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risky HROs demonstrated ways of acting and thinking that prevented problems aris-
ing, and if things did go awry, were able to contain problems to prevent them from
escalating. Resilience, from this perspective, is the ability of organizations to be-
come resourceful in their ability to maintain positive adjustment under challenging
conditions [27] and ‘bounce back’ from untoward, surprising, or disruptive events
[8, 30]. Resilience approaches emphasize the idea that disruptive events are com-
plex incidents that occur regularly and that systems should be designed to bounce
back quicker and stronger because the impact was less. More resilient systems can
withstand disruption, suggesting the idea that there is a flexible continuum between
the reliable system and the ‘normal accident’. Resilience is: ’...the ability to reduce
the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events. The effectiveness of a resilient
infrastructure or enterprise depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to,
and/or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive event.’ [26].
What emerges from the research and the ethnographic fieldwork is a detailed un-
derstanding of the way in which resilience is an essential aspect of the collaborative,
social, character of work. Any computer systems that are used, whatever ’techno-
logical’ characteristics they may have, are thoroughly ’social’ (and organizational)
in character and thus designing and implementing ‘resilience’ into distributed and
shared systems of work requires that this fundamentally social dimension has to
be taken into account. This involves considering the ways in which plans and pro-
cedures for resilience, and adjustment to failure, are placed within an appropriate
social and organizational context, as elements which enable workers to make sense
of their work and come to a decision about future courses of action. Within CSCW
research the work of Suchman and others [23, 24, 25] illustrate how important it
was to consider the ‘fit’ of any models of resilience and risk-taking with the ways in
which work is actually done. It is people that do the work in organizations, not ide-
alized models or plans. People are ’rule users’ rather than merely ’rule followers’. It
is the everyday judgment of workers, in interpreting and improvising standard pro-
cedures or plans, that gets the work done and prevents or reacts to failure. As our
observations suggest, the problem with resilience is that even when presented with
instructions that ‘anyone’ should be able to understand and follow, practical troubles
still arise, and users characteristically rush to premature and often mistaken conclu-
sions about what has happened, what is happening, what the machine ‘meant’, what
the machine ‘is thinking’, and so on. What is also important – as far as resilience
is concerned – is some notion of ‘awareness’ – knowing about, knowing how to
use, that information, those artefacts, etc., that are relevant to the accomplishment
of work [20, 25]; exercising judgment in light of the various contingencies and un-
certainties that arise during the course of work. In this chapter, we have considered
the importance of various human and organizational factors in the promotion of re-
silience. This recognizes the identification of human errors as the greatest threat to
cyber-security, and also that humans appear to be highly prone to cyber-attacks, e.g.,
social engineering and spear phishing attacks. Although a set of guidelines exists in
the EU (i.e., EUs cyber incident reporting system), it appears that these are currently
not well integrated in all critical infrastructures. Our analysis indicates the need to
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put security response teams in place, which eventually will help to improve security
awareness as well as resilience in critical infrastructures provisioning.
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